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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
abandon facilities at will and without regard to prior approval of the Com-
mission.2 3 Thus the consuming public is left a prey to exploitation at the
hands of the interstate distributors of natural gas in spite of the expressed
intention of Congress to prevent that exploitation, and the designated ad-
ministrative agency is rendered powerless to perform its assigned duties.
The power to cure the defect thus made apparent seems to rest with
Congress.
ADMIRALTY-MAINTENANCE AND CURE
Libelant, a member of the Merchant Marine, was injured while overleave
and returning to his ship. After being treated in various hospitals he was
discharged as completely disabled. He was totally and permanently blind, and
from time to time would require some medical care to ease attacks of head-
aches and epileptic convulsions. Petitioner contended that he was entitled to
maintenance and cure as long as he was disabled, which in this case would
be for life. The Court of Appeals awarded him maintenance and cure for a
six month period after he was discharged from the hospital. Held, on certiorari,
he was not entitled to a lump sum payment, but the court intimated that he
could recover in future suits for any disbursements for further medical treat-
ments found necessary. Farrell v. United States, 69 Sup. Ct. 707 (1949)
(four Justices dissenting).
The duty of the owner of a vessel to provide maintenance I and cure 2
for seamen injured or becoming ill while in the service of the ship has been
recognized by most maritime nations as an implied part of the contract of
employment.3 To saddle the owner with the expense of maintenance and cure
the seaman need only show that the injury or illness was incurred while in
the service of the ship, 4 even though the effects thereof do not become evident
contracted to, sell its production for fifteen years through an intrastate distributor
which would be outside the jurisdiction of the Commission. Under this decision there
remains nothing to prevent defendant from doing the same thing with any or all of its
reserves which lie entirely within any given state.
23. If defendant can dispose of its reserves of gas at will as permitted under this
decision it can render itself void of any natural gas to send through its pipeline facilities.
If it has no gas, and cannot buy gas for its interstate distributing system at a rate
approved by the Commission, then its pipe lines are abandoned in fact without the
Commission's approval.
1. "Maintenance is food and lodging at the expense of the ship." The Bouker No.
2, 241 Fed. 831, 835 (2d Cir. 1917).
2. "Cure is used in its original meaning of taking charge of, or care of the disabled
seaman, and not in that of a positive cure which may be impossible." The Atlantic, 2
Fed. Cas. No. 620, at 131 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849).
3. The Atlantic, supra at 130; THE LAWS OF OLEROrN Art. VI, VII, 30 Fed. Cas.
1174; THE LAws or Wlssuav, Art, XVIII, XIX, 30 Fed. Cas. 1191; THE LAWS OF
THE HANsE TowNs, Art. XXXIX, XLV, 30 Fed. Cas. 1200; THE MARINE ORtDNAN E
OF Louts XIV, Title Fourth, Art. XI, 30 Fed. Cas. 1209.
4. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943); Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed.
Cas. 480, No. 6,047 (C.D.D. Me. 1823) ; Cordes v. Weyerhaeuer S.S. Co., 75 F.
Supp. 537 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
CASES NOTED
until long after the termination of the voyage.5 It has been held that this
liability, once incurred, extends for a reasonable time after the voyage,0 or
until the physical condition of the seaman is such that further medical aid
cannot improve his condition. 7 The owner's only defense against the imposi-
tion of such liability appears to be a showing that the injury was caused by
the intemperance 8 or moral turpitude 9 of the seaman.
The doctrine as first promulgated sought to give the seaman a liberal
remedy not bounded by the obstacles which he would encounter by recourse
to the common-law courts such as contributory negligence, 1o assumption of
risk," or the fellow servant rule.' 2 Recovery was permitted for medical ex-
penses received for the treatment of accidents or illnesses which clearly were
not proximately caused by his service. I3 However, a few of the lower federal
courts limited the right of recovery by requiring the claimant to show he
received the injury while performing labor in discharge of his employment, 14
or in "line of duty." 15
In recent years the Supreme Court has harmonized the conflicting de-
cisions of the lower federal courts 16 and in so doing has gradually increased
the scope of maintenance and cure to compensate seamen irrespective of the
causal relation between their duty and the injury.17 However, it was intimated
in Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Taylor I that the fact that the injury was not
in the service of the ship, while not defeating recovery, might affect the mode
thereof.' In that case, a seaman was denied a lump sum payment for an in-
curable disease not caused by the employment, but because of the progressive
nature of the disease was allowed to bring supplemental suits for any money
expended for necessary medical aid. The Court further said that, had the
5. Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 577
(1941).
6. The Ipswich, 46 F.2d 136 (D.C. Md. 1930); The Bunker Hill, 198 Fed. 587
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1912). But cf. The J. F. Card, 43 Fed. 92 (E.D. Mich. 1890); The
Atlantic, supra.
7. Reed v Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426, No. 11,641 (C.C. Mass. 1832); The Kenil-
worth, 144 Fed. 376 (3d Cir. 1906) ; The Mars, 149 Fed. 729 (3d Cir. 1907).
8. Barlow v. Pan American S.S. Co., 101 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1939); The Panama
City, 23 F. Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) But cf. The Anna Howard Shaw, 75 F. Supp.
210 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Contra, The Quaker City. I F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Pa. 1931).
9. The Alector, 263 Fed. 1007 (E.D. Va. 1920) (venereal disease). Burt 4f.
Koistenen v. American Export Lines, 83 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948).
10. Storgard v. France and Canada S.S. Corp., 263 Fed. 545 (2d Cir. 1920), cert.
denied, 252 U.S. 585 (1920).
11. Hanson v. Luckenbach .S.S. Co., 65 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1933).
12. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
13. Ringgold v. Crocker. 20 Fed. Cas. 813, No. 11,843 (1848); Koistenen v.
American Export Lines, 83 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948).
14. Smith v. American South African Lines, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1941) ; The President Coolidge, 23 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Wash. 1938).
15. Meyer v. Dollar S.S. Line, 49 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1931); Collins v. Dollar
S.S. Line, 23 F. Sunp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
16. See notes 13, 14, 15 supra
17. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., supra.
18. 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
19. Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Taylor, supra at 530.
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injury arisen out of, or been due to the employment, recovery of a lump sum
payment might be warranted. The court in the instant case by refusing to
allow recovery in a lump sum payment where the injury arose out of the
employment refutes that possible distinction, and decides that the measure
of recovery should be the same whether or not the injury or illness results
from the employment.
In deciding the principal case the court was cognizant of the impossibility
of ascertaining the future expenses of the seaman; the indefiniteness of the
mortality table would make its use impracticable as a basis for a lump sum
award, and the sliding scale between injuries and illness, thus bringing about
lack of uniformity and difficulty of application. Giving the seaman a sum for
future medical treatment, where such treatment may be ascertained, has been
allowed by admiralty courts, 20 but a lump sum payment making the ship-
owner an insurer would be contrary to the spirit of the doctrine. The im-
provident nature of the seaman underlies the policy of the court in limiting
recovery to the amount that the sailor has paid out for medical aid.2 1 If a lump
sum was allowed and the money was dissipated, the sailor would be left to
his own resources and would undoubtedly become a charge of the state, which
the doctrine, as formulated, sought to prevent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-FAIR
TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY
Defendant, a communist, was convicted of contempt for wilful failure
to respond to a subpoena issued by the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. The trial court refused defendant's motion to exclude from jury
service those jurors who were employees of the Federal Government. Held,
on appeal, that denial of petitioner's motion to exclude all government em-
ployees from the jury panel did not deprive defendant of a fair trial by an
impartial jury. Dennis v. United States, 171 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert.
granted, 18 U.S.L. Week (U.S. July 5, 1949).
The Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides for the
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. At common law, Crown employees
were absolutely disqualified from serving as jurors in criminal cases; 2 but
Congress removed such disqualification regarding criminal trials in the District
20. Barnes v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 79 F. Supp. 699 (N-D. Cal. 1948);
United States v. Robinson, 170 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1948) (by implication).
21. See Hardin v. Gordin, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6,047, at 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
1. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
2. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1908) (common-law grounds).
